Protection Study
By David Grabiner
There has been a lot of debate on the importance of protection; does it
help to bat in front of a great hitter? It is easy to cite individual
examples of players who hit better or worse when their protection
situation changed, but this doesn't prove anything, since there will
always be hitters who improve or decline just by chance.
Protection has a clear effect on runs scored, since a good hitter is
more likely than a bad hitter to drive runners in. It also has a clear
effect on intentional walks. These will have small secondary effects on
raw totals such as hits and home runs, since an intentional walk
prevents the batter from getting them; there may also be a larger
secondary effect on RBI, since intentional walks are given only with
runners in scoring position.
I'm interested in finding out whether there is any actual effect on the
hitter. When they do pitch to him, does he do better when protected
than when unprotected? Thus I will primarily be comparing batting and
slugging average.
The only previous clear data of this type was a study by Bill James in
the 1985 Baseball Abstract, looking at Dale Murphy and Bob Horner.
Murphy hit .265 with Horner in the lineup, and .281 with the same power
with Horner out. (This is not a statistically significant difference.)
It's a large sample, but it's just one player; the effect might not
matter for Murphy, but it might affect other players.
Now, I have looked at the 1991 AL, and identified twenty-five players
who might have benefited from protection. They did not hit any better
when protected; therefore, I must conclude that protection is not a
significant effect. Details follow.
I considered a hitter to be capable of providing protection if he was a
regular who had both a slugging percentage of at least .450 and a good
reputation. Mike Macfarlane, for example, slugged .506 in a
half-season, but I don't think pitchers were frightened when he was on
deck.
A player was eligible for the study if he had at least 100 AB protected
by a big hitter, and 100 AB not protected. If protection helps a
player, these players should hit better when protected than when
unprotected. If it doesn't help, half should do better and half worse
by chance. That's about what happened, with ten of twenty-five hitting
better when protected, and fifteen worse.
Here is the list of big hitters I used. The criteria were necessarily
somewhat subjective; reputation became less important as slugging
percentage went up. In particular, hitters in the .450-.470 range had
to have a clear reputation.
Player Team SLG
Baines Oak .473
Belle Cle .540
Boggs Bos .460
Buhner Sea .498
Canseco Oak .556
Carter Tor .503
Clark Bos .466
Davis Min .507
Fielder Det .513
Franco Tex .474
Gonzalez Tex .479
Griffey Sea .527
Hrbek Min .461
Joyner Cal .488
Mack Min .529
Molitor Mil .489
Puckett Min .460
Ripken Bal .566
Sierra Tex .502
Tartabull KC .593
Tettleton Det .491
Thomas Chi .553
Whitaker Det .489
Winfield Cal .472
The non-qualifying regulars over .450 were Downing, Hall, Dave
Henderson, Horn, Martinez, Pasqua, Reimer, Greg Vaughn, and White; of
these, all but Horn and Reimer were below .470. Moving a few players
from one list to the other wouldn't make a significant difference in the
study.
Here are the twenty-five players, with comments. The "Protected" lines
include all plate appearances with any of the big hitters on deck; for
all but Downing, Pettis, and Sierra (all Texas players), one big hitter
did almost all of the protecting.
Roberto Alomar, Toronto
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 637 188 41 11 9 57 4 5 .295 .354 .436
Protected 530 162 32 10 9 46 2 3 .312 .361 .455
Unprotected 107 26 9 1 0 9 2 2 .243 .314 .346
Does it help to bat in front of Joe Carter? Alomar started the season
batting second in front of Kelly Gruber, with Carter third. When Gruber
went out on May 1 with an injury, Carter moved up to third, and stayed
there for almost all of the rest of the season. That looks like a
protection situation.
Alomar's splits suggest it helps, but see Kelly Gruber below for the
other side. Alomar hit for a much higher average with Carter on deck,
but it was only 107 AB; he could easily have a one-month slump at the
same level.
The two lines would match in batting and slugging average if four
singles, a double, and a homer (and the six hits) were moved from the
"Protected" to the "Unprotected" line. That's the difference between
what Alomar hit when unprotected, and what he would be expected to hit
if protection had no effect. We'll look at this for all of the players.
Brady Anderson, Baltimore
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 256 59 12 3 2 38 5 3 .230 .338 .324
Protected 117 23 7 0 2 22 1 0 .197 .329 .308
Unprotected 139 36 5 3 0 16 4 3 .249 .346 .338
Cal Ripken batted third for Baltimore, and was far better than anyone
else in the lineup; this was his MVP season. Anderson batted second
half the time he played. In other games, he usually came off the bench
and batted in front of almost everyone else, with a short stretch as the
leadoff hitter in front of an Orsulak/Milligan platoon.
That .197 average stands out because it is below the Mendoza line, but
the actual split is small, particularly given the small sample size (the
least reliable in the study). The lines would match if six singles were
moved to the "Protected" line and two doubles moved back, a net shift of
only two total bases.
Carlos Baerga, Cleveland
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 593 171 28 2 11 48 6 3 .288 .346 .398
Protected 271 75 12 0 4 22 4 1 .277 .339 .365
Unprotected 322 96 16 2 7 26 2 2 .298 .352 .425
Baerga is a particularly useful case, because we have reasonably large
samples of both protected and unprotected play. Baerga usually batted
third, in front of Albert Belle. However, Belle missed 39 games (mostly
with injuries), and the Indians also juggled the lineup during the
season, so Baerga often batted elsewhere. The other batters behind him
were never close to Belle's quality; Belle hit 28 homers in 461 at-bats
and slugged .540. This was Belle's first full season, but he was a
highly regarded prospect, and hit far better than anyone else on the
team.
Baerga hit somewhat better when he wasn't protected; the two lines above
would be a perfect match if one double, one triple, and one homer were
transferred to the "Protected" line.
George Brett, Kansas City
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 505 129 40 2 10 58 0 8 .255 .327 .402
Protected 395 96 30 0 8 48 0 6 .243 .321 .380
Unprotected 110 33 10 2 2 10 0 2 .300 .352 .482
The classic protection situation: Brett batted third and Danny Tartabull
batted cleanup for the Royals all year, except when one of them was
hurt. When Tartabull was out of the lineup, the Royals' cleanup hitter
was usually someone like Jim Eisenreich.
The 102-point difference in slugging looks impressive, but it is just
110 AB; move five hits to the "Protected" line, including both triples,
and the split disappears. Still, it's hard to argue that Tartabull's
absence hurt Brett.
Jose Canseco, Oakland
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 572 152 32 1 44 78 9 6 .266 .359 .556
Protected 422 113 24 1 33 66 9 6 .268 .374 .564
Unprotected 150 39 8 0 11 12 0 0 .260 .315 .533
The protection situation isn't as clear here. Canseco was only
considered "Protected" when he batted in front of Harold Baines and his
.473 SLG. The "Unprotected" at-bats were split between Dave Henderson,
Mark McGwire, and Terry Steinbach in the cleanup spot behind Canseco.
Henderson hit almost as well as Baines, but didn't have the reputation.
McGwire had the reputation, but had a poor season, hitting only .201
with a .383 SLG. Only Steinbach was your typical non-protecting cleanup
hitter.
And the split that appears is not at all what you would expect from a
lack of protection. The batting and slugging averages are very close;
moving the triple to the "Unprotected" line would make them match. But
when Canseco could supposedly have been pitched around, he drew 12
BB+HBP instead of the expected 21.
Milt Cuyler, Detroit
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 475 122 15 7 3 52 5 2 .257 .335 .337
Protected 109 25 5 0 0 10 1 0 .229 .300 .275
Unprotected 366 97 10 7 3 42 4 2 .265 .348 .355
This is an unusual protection situation, because of the spots in which
Cuyler batted. He was protected when he batted leadoff in front of
Whitaker. He usually batted ninth, with Phillips in the leadoff spot.
Cuyler hit worse when protected, even though you might expect him to be
placed in the leadoff spot against pitchers he was expected to hit well.
(Phillips was in the lineup in half of those games.) In 109 AB, it's
probably mainly a chance split, and not a very large one; moving a
single and two triples to the "Protected" line is enough to balance out
the splits.
Alvin Davis, Seattle
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 462 102 15 1 12 56 0 10 .221 .299 .335
Protected 148 32 2 0 2 8 0 0 .216 .256 .270
Unprotected 314 70 13 1 10 48 0 10 .223 .317 .366
When Davis was protected, he batted in front of Jay Buhner. They were
6th and 7th early in the season, moving to 4th and 5th later. The bottom
of Seattle's lineup wasn't stable; Davis never batted in front of the
other good hitters (Griffey and Martinez), but batted in front of
essentially everyone else other than Harold Reynolds.
The split in walks is large, and would be statistically significant
in isolation, but Davis didn't show the other expected effects of
protection, declining across the board. To balance out the slugging
averages, you would need to move four doubles and two homers to the
"Protected" line, and six singles back.
Brian Downing, Texas
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 407 113 17 2 17 58 8 2 .278 .377 .455
Protected 257 64 8 2 10 30 3 1 .249 .333 .412
Unprotected 150 49 9 0 7 28 5 1 .327 .451 .527
Downing usually batted leadoff for the Rangers. Early in the season,
the big hitters batted in the 3-5 spots, with Huson, Petralli, and other
weak hitters batting second. Later, Franco and Palmeiro moved to the
second spot, both much more likely to drive Downing in if he got on
base.
Downing walked more when unprotected, but the primary cause of his
splits (the largest in AVG and OBP except for Pettis) was the increased
average. The lines would match if five singles, one double, and one
homer were moved to "Protected."
Cecil Fielder, Detroit
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 624 163 25 0 44 78 6 4 .261 .347 .513
Protected 515 136 21 0 39 63 4 4 .264 .346 .532
Unprotected 109 27 4 0 5 15 2 0 .248 .349 .422
Fielder batted cleanup in every Tiger game, usually in front of Mickey
Tettleton. When Tettleton wasn't in the lineup, the fifth-place hitter
was Incaviglia, Barnes, or sometimes Deer. This looks like a protection
situation, although Tettleton's reputation in 1991 is debatable.
The splits are the classical argument for protection; Fielder drew fewer
walks when protected, and hit for a higher average with more power. But
it's not a big difference in 109 AB; a double and two homers moved to
the "Unprotected" line with two singles coming back would be enough to
eliminate it.
Julio Franco, Texas
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 589 201 27 3 15 65 3 2 .341 .408 .474
Protected 370 135 18 3 9 33 1 2 .365 .416 .503
Unprotected 219 66 9 0 6 32 2 0 .301 .392 .425
Franco started the season batting fifth, in front of Kevin Reimer.
Later, he moved up, usually batting leadoff or second in front of
Palmeiro, or third in front of Sierra. Reimer slugged .477 but didn't
have a reputation as a big hitter, and Palmeiro and Sierra were even
better.
If protection helped a high-average hitter, you would expect to see
splits like Franco's. He walked more when unprotected; the walk split
is just short of two standard deviations, and goes over if you count
walks and HBP. But he gained about as much in hits as he lost in walks.
To match the batting and slugging averages, you would need to move eight
singles and one triple to the "Unprotected" line.
Kelly Gruber, Toronto
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 429 108 18 2 20 31 6 5 .252 .308 .443
Protected 103 25 2 1 3 9 2 1 .243 .310 .369
Unprotected 326 83 16 1 17 22 4 4 .255 .307 .466
Gruber batted third in April in front of Carter, went out on May 1,
returned on June 12 in the third spot, and then dropped to lower spots
(usually fourth through sixth) on June 20. When he wasn't batting
third, he batted in front of a variety of players, including Myers,
Mulliniks, Tabler, and Olerud, who was not a star then.
These splits are the reverse of what you would expect if protection were
an effect. Gruber drew more walks with Carter behind him, and lost some
power. It's not that big a split in 103 AB, though; the "Protected"
line would be a reasonable slump for him. The lines would match if one
double and two homers were moved to the "Protected" line, and two
singles moved back.
In fact, a normal cause of slumps may have something to do with these
splits; 27 of the 103 AB were the week Gruber came back from his injury.
(He hit about the same that week as in the other unprotected AB, 6 for
27 with a double and a homer.)
Brian Harper, Minnesota
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 441 137 28 1 10 14 6 6 .311 .336 .447
Protected 204 60 5 1 4 6 2 3 .294 .316 .387
Unprotected 237 77 23 0 6 8 4 3 .325 .353 .498
Harper usually batted sixth, sometimes fifth, and sometimes came off the
bench. Since the bottom of Minnesota's lineup wasn't stable early in
the season, this put him in front of an assortment of weak hitters.
Shane Mack started the season as a bench player, batting eighth when he
started, but settled in to the seventh spot behind Harper on July 21.
Harper slumped late in the season, hitting only eight doubles after the
All-Star break; hit protection splits reflect the fact that he was
protected during this slump. The doubles split is more than two
standard deviations, but it isn't large enough to put the slugging
average split over two standard deviations. To balance the batting and
slugging averages (but not the lines), we need to move four homers to
the "Protected" line and the triple back; to balance the lines
themselves would require more changes.
Dave Henderson, Oakland
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 572 158 33 0 25 58 4 2 .276 .346 .465
Protected 424 115 28 0 21 34 4 2 .274 .332 .488
Unprotected 148 42 5 0 4 24 0 0 .284 .384 .399
A near-classic situation; Henderson was protected when he batted second
in front of Canseco, but not when he batted fifth behind Canseco and
Baines, or cleanup behind Canseco with Baines out of the lineup. When
Henderson wasn't protected, the hitter behind him was usually Steinbach
or McGwire.
The splits are exactly what you would expect if protection were an
effect; his OBP jumped when unprotected, mainly due to walks (only three
intentional) while his power dropped. To get the lines to match, you
would need to move three homers and three doubles to the "Unprotected"
line, and seven singles back.
Wally Joyner, California
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 551 166 34 3 21 52 1 5 .301 .360 .488
Protected 426 134 26 2 15 38 1 5 .315 .368 .491
Unprotected 125 32 8 1 6 14 0 0 .256 .331 .464
Another classic protection situation. Joyner usually batted third with
Dave Winfield cleanup, and there were some games in which Joyner batted
second with Winfield third. When Winfield wasn't in the lineup, the
batter behind Joyner was usually Dave Parker or Gary Gaetti, neither one
of whom struck fear in the hearts of opposing pitchers.
The batting average splits are similar to Alomar's, but Joyner
compensated somewhat by hitting for more power. As with Alomar, the
effect is likely to have come from the small sample size. The batting
and slugging averages would match if seven singles were moved to the
"Unprotected" line, and a homer moved the other way.
Joe Orsulak, Baltimore
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 486 135 22 1 5 28 4 3 .278 .321 .358
Protected 276 79 14 1 2 11 3 2 .286 .318 .366
Unprotected 210 56 8 0 3 17 1 1 .267 .323 .348
Orsulak's usual spot was second, in front of Ripken, but he also came
off the bench frequently, batting in random lineup spots, and spent one
stretch in the cleanup spot in front of Milligan and Evans.
I suppose you could say that Orsulak had classic splits; he hit for a
higher average when protected, with fewer walks giving him a lower OBP.
But the splits are tiny, the smallest in the study; they would match if
two singles were moved to the "Unprotected" line.
Gary Pettis, Texas
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 282 61 7 5 0 54 0 1 .216 .341 .277
Protected 122 21 3 2 0 16 0 0 .172 .268 .230
Unprotected 160 40 4 1 0 38 0 1 .250 .392 .313
When Pettis was in the starting lineup, he usually batted leadoff or
ninth. In both spots, he was often in front of Franco, and occasionally
Palmeiro; at other times, he was ninth in front of Downing, or leadoff
in front of mediocre hitters. He also came off the bench, usually as a
pinch-runner or defensive replacement for outfielders rather than as a
pinch-hitter; this put him all over the lineup.
The small sample size means that these large splits are less significant
than they appear to be. Even the large walk split is under two standard
deviations. It's also probably not real; walks are not listed directly
in the boxscore, which forced me to guess which one of two players
walked when a lineup spot had four AB in five plate appearances. For
most playes, this wasn't a serious problem, but Pettis had a lot of
games in which he went 0-for-0 after entering as a defensive replacement
or pinch-runner. I assumed that he didn't walk in these games, but
probably got some wrong.
Likewise with the apparently large splits elsewhere; moving four singles
and one double to "Protected" will balance the batting and slugging
averages. Pettis's splits are of interest because they contribute to
the overall totals.
Tony Phillips, Detroit
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 564 160 28 4 17 79 3 6 .284 .371 .438
Protected 322 86 13 2 5 41 1 3 .267 .349 .366
Unprotected 242 74 15 2 12 38 2 3 .306 .401 .533
The protection situation is reasonably clear here, and there is a large
sample of data. Phillips usually batted leadoff, with Whitaker slugging
.489 and batting second. When Whitaker was out of the lineup or batted
elsewhere, the second hitter was Moseby, Barnes, Trammell, or Fryman,
none of them as good as Whitaker. Phillips also spent some time in the
second spot in front of Trammell. For all that Trammell and Whitaker
have been connected, Trammell had fallen to a .373 SLG that year.
Phillips lost so much power when protected that he had the only split of
more than two standard deviations in slugging average in the whole
study. If this were all the data available, it would be statistically
significant evidence that protection hurts a batter, but given that
twenty players were studied, you would expect to find one split this
large if there were no effect. To match the lines requires moving 23
total bases; that is, you would have to move six homers to the
"Protected" line and take back one single. This is much more than for
any other player in the study.
Actually, there's a reason which has nothing to do with protection for
part of the split. Most of the games Whitaker didn't start were against
left-handed pitchers. Phillips, although a switch-hitter, has a large
platoon split, but not this large.
Luis Polonia, California
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 604 179 28 9 2 52 1 3 .296 .352 .379
Protected 205 56 7 3 1 10 0 1 .273 .320 .351
Unprotected 399 123 21 5 1 42 1 2 .308 .374 .393
Another player with clear protection and a lot of data. Polonia was the
Angels' leadoff hitter. Wally Joyner usually batted third, with
Schofield, Hill, Sojo, or Felix second, but Joyner also spent a lot of
time in the second spot, behind Polonia.
Polonia walked less when protected, and this split would actually be
statistically significant in isolation. However, he declined in other
areas as well. To make the batting and slugging averages match, you
would need to move five singles and a double to the "Protected" line.
Carlos Quintana, Boston
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 478 141 21 1 11 61 2 3 .295 .375 .412
Protected 198 53 8 0 8 28 1 1 .268 .360 .429
Unprotected 280 99 13 1 3 33 1 2 .314 .389 .400
Another classic protection situation. When Quintana batted third, he
was protected by Jack Clark; when he didn't bat third, he usually batted
seventh in front of Pena, or sixth in front of assorted hitters. He
also came off the bench a lot, which put him in random lineup spots.
In any study, you will find some weird splits by chance, and that's what
happened here. Quintana hit for a higher average when he wasn't
protected, but he lost most of his power. His OPS didn't change at all.
Since we are primarily interested in SLG, he is considered a player who
improved when protected.
The lines have to change a lot to balance; move nine singles to
"Protected", and two homers and two doubles to "Unprotected".
Kevin Reimer, Texas
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 394 106 22 0 20 33 7 6 .269 .332 .477
Protected 218 63 13 0 7 22 6 3 .283 .365 .445
Unprotected 176 43 9 0 13 11 1 3 .244 .288 .517
A natural protection situation. Reimer often batted fifth or sixth in
front of Juan Gonzalez, but he also batted sixth behind Gonzalez, with a
weak hitter (often Buechele, but several weaker hitters as well) batting
seventh. Reimer also pinch-hit a lot, which put him in random spots
near the bottom of the lineup.
Yes, the lines above are in the correct order; Reimer hit for more
power when he didn't have Gonzalez on deck, but drew more walks when
Gonzalez was in position to drive him in. Although his OPS was higher
when he was protected, we are primarily interested in SLG, and will
consider him as a player who hit better when unprotected.
The near-even split of protected and unprotected AB makes his data
moderately reliable despite the small sample size. But as with
Quintana, the weird splits mean that more change is needed to balance
the lines than would be suggested by the difference. We need to move
four homers to "Protected", and seven singles and a double back, to
switch seven total bases while balancing the batting average.
Harold Reynolds, Seattle
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 631 160 34 6 3 72 5 6 .253 .331 .340
Protected 377 106 17 3 2 42 1 1 .281 .353 .358
Unprotected 254 54 17 3 1 30 4 5 .213 .300 .314
The existence of protection is clear here, and Reynolds gives a large
sample both ways. When Reynolds batted second, Ken Griffey Jr. was
almost always on deck. When he batted leadoff, the #2 hitter was
usually Briley or Cotto, and only rarely Martinez.
Reynolds hit for a much higher average when protected; this is the most
significant batting-average split, although it's just under two standard
deviations. But the net gain isn't that great, because he lost a bit of
power. To get a good match, you would have to move 14 singles to the
"Unprotected" line, and four doubles back.
Luis Rivera, Boston
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 414 107 22 3 8 35 3 4 .258 .318 .384
Protected 255 59 11 3 3 19 3 1 .231 .291 .333
Unprotected 159 48 11 0 5 16 0 3 .302 .360 .465
Rivera was protected in an unconventional way. He usually batted ninth,
with Wade Boggs batting leadoff. When Boggs batted third, Steve Lyons
and Jody Reed, neither one close to Boggs's ability, batted leadoff
behind Rivera. Rivera also had a few games in which he batted elsewhere
near the bottom of the lineup, in front of miscellaneous mediocre
hitters.
Rivera hit much better when he didn't have Boggs on deck; he hit like a
shortstop when he was protected, and like a high-average power hitter
when he was. The splits aren't statistically significant in isolation,
but they are fairly strong. To match the lines, you would need to move
five singles and two homers to the "Protected" line.
Ruben Sierra, Texas
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 661 203 44 5 25 56 0 9 .307 .357 .502
Protected 513 149 29 4 20 45 0 6 .290 .350 .480
Unprotected 148 54 15 1 5 11 0 3 .365 .401 .581
Texas had several excellent hitters to bat behind Sierra. Sierra
usually batted cleanup in front of Julio Franco, but also often hit
third in front of Rafael Palmeiro or Juan Gonzalez, both certainly
capable of protecting him as well as Franco did. The "Unprotected"
games were almost all in front of Kevin Reimer, who had a slugging
average as high as Franco and Gonzalez had, but didn't have a reputation
as a great hitter.
Sierra hit much better when he wasn't protected, with three brief hot
streaks coinciding with periods in which Reimer batted behind him. Six
singles and three doubles would have to be moved to "Protected" to cover
the difference.
Dale Sveum, Milwaukee
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 266 64 19 1 4 32 1 4 .241 .320 .365
Protected 125 25 11 1 0 17 0 2 .200 .292 .304
Unprotected 141 39 8 0 4 15 1 2 .277 .346 .418
As with Rivera, this isn't what you normally think of as protection, but
the effect should be the same. Sveum batted ninth half the time, with
leadoff hitter Paul Molitor on deck. Otherwise, he usually batted
eighth, with Spiers on deck.
It's only a small sample, but it shows the reverse of the expected
effects of protection. Sveum hit for a much higher average with decent
power and fewer walks when Molitor wasn't on deck to drive him in. To
balance the lines, you would need to move four singles and a homer to
the "Protected" line.
Robin Ventura, Chicago
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 606 172 25 1 23 80 4 7 .284 .367 .442
Protected 505 145 22 1 22 63 3 6 .287 .366 .465
Unprotected 101 27 3 0 1 17 1 1 .267 .375 .327
He barely made the study, but it's a classic case of protection, and he
had the biggest gains when protected of anyone in the study. Ventura
usually batted third in front of Frank Thomas. When Thomas wasn't
batting cleanup, Fisk batted there, and didn't hit well; Ventura also
spend a short stretch batting fifth or sixth in front of Sosa.
Ventura had strong, classic splits; he had no power at all when Thomas
wasn't on deck. To balance the lines, you would need to move three
homers and two doubles to "Unprotected", and two singles back. It's not
likely that such a large split would happen by chance, but it is
possible; the slugging average split still isn't statistically
significant, and power hitters can spend one month without hitting any
homers.
Now, we have twenty-five hitters, of varying quality, style, and
protection situations. Some hit better when protected, while some hit
worse. Only one individual split in slugging average, none in batting
average, and three in walks are more than two standard deviations from
even, which is about what you would expect if there were no effect, or
if the individual effects were too small to measure. In all, the
players had 7407 AB protected, 5092 not protected, and 4032 taking the
smaller subset for each player, which is enough to make totals
meaningful; the standard deviation of batting average in 5092 AB is only
.006.
Let's add together the differences, to see what would
have to be changed for the players to have matching splits in batting
and slugging averages. A plus sign below means that the extra hit would
have to be moved to the "Unprotected" totals to get a balance, because
the player hit better when protected.
1B 2B 3B HR H TB
Alomar +4 +1 0 +1 +6 +10
Anderson +6 -2 0 0 +4 +2
Baerga 0 -1 -1 -1 -3 -9
Brett -3 0 -2 0 -5 -9
Canseco 0 0 +1 0 +1 +3
Cuyler -1 0 -2 0 -3 -7
Davis +6 -4 0 -2 0 -10
Downing -5 -1 0 -1 -7 -11
Fielder -2 +1 0 +2 +1 +8
Franco +8 0 +1 0 +9 +11
Gruber +2 -1 0 -2 -1 -8
Harper 0 0 +1 -4 -3 -13
Henderson -7 +3 0 +3 -1 +11
Joyner +7 0 0 -1 +6 +3
Orsulak +2 0 0 0 +2 +2
Pettis -4 -1 0 0 -5 -6
Phillips +1 0 0 -6 -5 -23
Polonia -5 -2 0 0 -7 -9
Quintana +9 -2 0 -2 +5 -3
Reimer +7 +1 0 -4 +4 -7
Reynolds +14 -4 0 0 +10 +6
Rivera -5 0 0 -2 -7 -13
Sierra -6 -3 0 0 -9 -12
Sveum -4 0 0 -1 -5 -8
Ventura -2 +2 0 +3 +3 +14
TOTALS +22 -13 -2 -17 -10 -78
The players hit slightly better when *not* protected. In 5092 protected
AB, the difference would be two points of batting average and fifteen
points of slugging average, and in 7407 unprotected AB, it would be one
point of batting average and ten points of slugging average. The
overall difference is thus three points of BA and 26 points of SLG (not
25 because of rounding)
In baseball terms, that's a small split, with little effect on the
players' value. But in statistical terms, it's actually fairly large
because of the huge sample; 12499 AB is almost one-sixth of all the AB
in the AL that year. I estimate the standard deviation of the
difference in SLG to be .015. Thus the .026 isn't statistically
significant evidence that protection hurts hitters, or even that it
doesn't help, but it is statistically significant evidence that
protection doesn't help SLG by more than .004.
There also wasn't any consistency to the players who were helped or hurt
by protection, which suggests that there isn't an ability which helps
some subset of the players. Phillips and Ventura had almost identical
batting records, but they had the most extreme splits in opposite
directions. Reynolds and Cuyler were similar players with opposite
splits. Reimer and Sierra hit worse when protected, while Fielder and
Henderson hit better. Three of the ten undisciplined hitters (less than
one walk per 10 AB) hit better when protected, while seven hit worse.
The evidence thus suggests that protection doesn't matter at the
major-league level; it doesn't help to bat in front of a big-name
hitter.
